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Venezuela as a case study in limited
(sovereign) liability
W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Matt Gauthier*
1. Introduction
Venezuela is in a severe economic crisis. An October 2016 debt swap bought some time
for beleaguered state-owned oil company Petro´leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), but
there remains speculation about default by both PDVSA and the government.1 Default
would invite comparisons to the case of Argentina. Like that country, Venezuela has
issued bonds governed by New York law and accepted the jurisdiction of New York
courts. Some Venezuelan bonds also include the same pari passu clause used by
Argentina, which holdout creditors used to extract a preferential settlement.2 The
Venezuelan economy, moreover, is largely dependent on oil exports. A default by either
the government or PDVSA would prompt creditors to try to seize oil-related assets, such
as rights to payment for oil shipments. In short, Venezuela, like Argentina, may prove a
tempting target for litigation by holdout creditors.
In this article, we explore some of the legal considerations that would govern such
litigation. We do not address the pari passu clause, which has been covered at length
elsewhere.3 Nor do we address prospects for a successful restructuring, although we
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concede that Venezuela has options not available to Argentina.4 Instead, our goal is to
address speculation that, because the Venezuelan economy depends so heavily on oil
revenues, the country is uniquely susceptible to litigation by holdout creditors, who could
position themselves to seize oil-related assets. We emphasize barriers to such litigation,
which will be familiar to corporate lawyers but are often overlooked in discussions of
sovereign debt. For instance, PDVSA does not own its hydrocarbon reserves; these belong
to Venezuela. To frustrate PDVSA’s creditors, the government might transfer exploitation
rights to a new entity.5 Moreover, neither the government nor PDVSA directly own oil-
related assets outside of Venezuela. Instead, they own shares in other entities, which
directly or indirectly control foreign oil assets. To get at these assets, creditors of
Venezuela and PDVSA will have to overcome the barrier posed by the corporate law
doctrine of limited liability.
We do not purport to predict the outcome of any disputes that might arise in the wake
of a default, nor do we consider the many questions that would be raised by a bankruptcy
proceeding involving PDVSA or its subsidiaries. Instead, using Venezuela as a case study,
we explore how questions of limited liability can affect the relative rights and bargaining
power of a sovereign debtor and its creditors. We also highlight some unusual aspects of
limited liability rules as applied to entities owned or controlled by foreign governments.
For instance, the doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’—often maligned as incoherent
and unprincipled by corporate law scholars—is particularly ill-suited for cases in which a
corporation is owned by a foreign government.
2. The limits of limited liability
Accounts of sovereign debt litigation often overemphasize the law of sovereign immunity.
In fact, however, most sovereign bonds issued in foreign markets (including bonds issued
by Venezuela and PDVSA) include a waiver of sovereign immunity. Yet even when
sovereign immunity is not a factor, creditors will find that many of the most tempting
assets belong to legally separate entities. Under the doctrine of limited liability,
shareholders are not personally liable for debts of the firm except to the extent their own
conduct provides a basis for liability.6 Likewise, although a judgment creditor may attach
corporate shares owned by the debtor, it may not proceed directly against the corporation
or its assets. The principle of limited liability also has exceptions, under which a firm’s
creditors may impose liability or enforce judgments against the firm’s shareholders, or
against its parent or affiliate corporations. For simplicity, we refer to these exceptions as
‘veil piercing’ doctrines, although we concede that the label obscures a great deal of legal
4 Argentina could not restructure its debt without the consent of each bondholder. See WMC Weidemaier, ‘Sovereign Debt after
NML v Argentina’ (2013) 8 Cap Mkts L J 123. Venezuela and PDVSA each have some ability to bind dissenting creditors to the
terms of a restructuring. Most outstanding Venezuelan bonds have collective action clauses. See Carletti and others (n 2). PDVSA
and its subsidiaries (unlike sovereign nations) can seek bankruptcy relief.
5 This possibility was raised most recently in a proposal by economist Ricardo Hausmann (Harvard) Mark Walker (of Millstein & Co).
6 See eg Model Business Corporation Act s 6.22 (2006).
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complexity.7 Again, our goal is only to highlight the range of disputes that might raise
issues of limited liability in the context of a default by Venezuela or PDVSA.
Veil-piercing doctrine, its critics and the problem of sovereign shareholders
At first glance, the law of veil piercing is straightforward and consistent across
jurisdictions (at least in the USA). Courts pierce the corporate veil and dispense with the
presumption of limited liability when (1) the owner exercises complete domination over
the corporation (often called the ‘alter ego’ or ‘mere instrumentality’ test) and (2) uses
that control to perpetrate a fraud or injustice (as when a shareholder siphons assets away
from the firm and its creditors).8 This apparent simplicity, however, quickly breaks down.
On occasion, the two parts of this test are phrased disjunctively, so that a creditor may
pierce the veil upon showing either control or fraud.9 Moreover, courts often analyse veil-
piercing questions by invoking a laundry list of factors. These include (among many
others):10
 undercapitalization;
 commingling of corporate and personal assets;
 failure to observe corporate formalities;
 failure to pay dividends;
 siphoning of corporate funds;
 failure to keep corporate records;
 the corporation’s payment of the shareholder’s personal obligations; and
 the shareholder’s use of the corporate form to pursue personal objectives.
Given this laundry list of factors, it is perhaps no surprise that the law of veil piercing has
been criticized as incoherent.11 Most notably, many of the factors invoked in veil-piercing
analysis have no obvious relevance to the reasons for recognizing limited liability in the
first place.12 These include facilitating efficient risk bearing and monitoring by capital
markets, enabling investor diversification,13 increasing liquidity14 and encouraging an
appropriate level of risk-taking by firms engaged in economic activity. It is not obvious
7 As examples of the doctrinal possibilities and complexity: the term ‘veil piercing’ may be viewed as most appropriate in
circumstances where the shareholder is a natural person, while ‘enterprise liability’ theories also allow creditors to reach assets of
parent and affiliate corporations engaged in a common business enterprise. See eg SM Bainbridge, ‘Abolishing Veil Piercing’ (2000)
26 J Corp Law 479. In ‘reverse’ veil piercing cases, creditors seek to impose liability on a corporation for the obligations of its
shareholder. Agency law may in some cases also provide a basis for imputing a subsidiary’s liability to a parent.
8 SB Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil s 1:1 (2016).
9 See eg First National City Bank v Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (1983) 462 US 611 [hereinafter Bancec]; Carte
Blanche Singapore v Diners Club Int’l 2 F 3d 24 (2nd Cir 1993).
10 RB Thompson, ‘Piercing the Veil within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors’ (1989) 13 Conn J Int’l
L 379.
11 See eg Bainbridge (n 7). This does not necessarily mean there is no order in the cases. See J Macey and J Mitts, ‘Finding Order
in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil’ (2014) 100 Cornell L Rev 99 (arguing that courts
pierce the veil to achieve the purpose of a statute or regulation, to prevent shareholders from obtaining credit by misrepresentation,
and to promote values associated with bankruptcy).
12 PB Oh, ‘Veil-Piercing Unbound’ (2013) 93 Boston Univ L Rev 89, 90.
13 Bainbridge (n 7).
14 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard UP 1991).
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why it advances these goals, say, to impose personal liability on a shareholder who has
failed to observe corporate formalities.15
Veil-piercing doctrine has been most heavily criticized in the field of corporate law.
But the doctrine is especially incoherent when applied to entities owned or controlled by
foreign sovereigns. Consider just three examples. First, much of the theory underlying the
doctrine of limited liability applies weakly, if at all, to such entities. Why would the State
of New York, for instance, care whether an entity wholly owned by a foreign government
has sufficient access to liquidity? Secondly, veil-piercing doctrine can border on the
nonsensical when applied to government-owned corporations. What could it mean, for
instance, to say that a foreign government has inappropriately used the corporate form to
pursue its own objectives? Governments create and control corporations precisely to
accomplish policy objectives. Thirdly, the doctrine of limited liability exists to insulate
shareholder assets from creditors of the corporation. But when the shareholder is a
foreign government, the law of sovereign immunity already gives it analogous (if not
completely overlapping) protection.16 Creditors who want more robust rights against
shareholders must contract for them ex ante.17
Although the topic is beyond the scope of this short essay, it is fair to say that the
doctrine of limited liability, and the exceptions we have loosely grouped under the ‘veil
piercing’ rubric, are ill-suited to scenarios involving entities owned or controlled by
foreign governments. For present purposes, it may be enough to say that comity and
reciprocity are more important considerations in this context. If nothing else, courts in
the USA should respect the separate legal status of entities owned or controlled by foreign
governments so that foreign courts do not casually disregard the boundaries between US
firms operating abroad,18 or between the US government and the instrumentalities
through which it pursues its policy objectives.
Veil piercing for sovereign-owned corporations
Although ill suited, the doctrine of veil piercing has been imported almost wholesale from
corporate law into the context of state-owned or controlled enterprises. In First National
City Bank v Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba [Bancec], the US Supreme Court
established a presumption that ‘when government instrumentalities [are] established as
15 See eg Bainbridge (n 7) 43.
16 This is especially true in the USA, where creditors of a sovereign may only reach property used for a commercial activity in the
USA if the property ‘is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based’. See 28 USC s 1610. Assume, for
instance, that a creditor of a state-owned enterprise engaged in commercial activity in the USA succeeded in piercing the corporate
veil and imposing liability on the foreign state. The creditor could attach state-owned property in the USA only by showing the
requisite nexus between the property and the commercial activity, giving rise to its claim. In many cases, the only such assets would
be those belonging to the corporation.
17 For instance, a private shareholder might agree to guarantee corporate debts. When the shareholder is a foreign government, it
would also have to waive its immunity from suit and execution. With a waiver of execution immunity, a creditor can seize a wider
range of commercial assets located in the USA. See 28 USC s 1610(a)(1).
18 See eg HR Rep No 1487, 94th Cong, 2nd Sess (1976), 29–30; DRC, Inc v Republic of Honduras, 71 F Supp 3d 201, 209 (DDC
2014). To be sure, this objective also supports limited liability in the context of firms owned or controlled by foreign private
shareholders. The distinction is that, in the sovereign context, the desire to protect US firms operating abroad is a central
justification for limited liability.
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juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign [they] should normally be
treated as such’.19 A creditor can pierce the veil only by showing that ‘a corporate entity is
so extensively controlled by its owner that relationship of principal and agent is created’
or that maintaining the presumption of limited liability would ‘work fraud or injustice’.20
As in the corporate law context, courts invoke a laundry list of factors in determining
whether a sovereign exercises sufficient control to justify veil piercing. These include
whether the foreign sovereign:
(1) uses the instrumentality’s property as its own; (2) ignores the instrumentality’s separate status or
ordinary corporate formalities; (3) deprives the instrumentality of the independence from close political
control that is generally enjoyed by government agencies; (4) requires the instrumentality to obtain
approvals for ordinary business decisions from a political actor; and (5) issues policies or directives that
cause the instrumentality to act directly on behalf of the sovereign state.21
Another list of factors shapes the inquiry into fraud and injustice. These include: using
the corporate form to commit illegal acts, ‘misusing’ the corporate form, and siphoning
assets or otherwise manipulating the corporate form to thwart creditors.22
3. Piercing the Venezuelan veil
Creditors seeking to enforce claims against Venezuela or PDVSA will invariably
encounter issues of limited liability. Although PDVSA is wholly owned by the
government of Venezuela, its creditors cannot pursue government assets without
piercing the corporate veil. Nor can the government’s creditors attempt to enforce their
claims directly against PDVSA or its assets.23 Moreover, to the extent either borrower
controls assets abroad, they do so primarily through ownership interests in legally
separate entities. PDVSA, for instance, is the ultimate corporate parent of CITGO
Petroleum Corporation (CITGO), the primary operator of PDVSA’s oil business in the
USA. Although CITGO’s assets might offer a tempting target for creditors, there are
multiple corporate layers between it and PDVSA (or Venezuela). CITGO is a wholly
owned subsidiary of CITGO Holding Inc., which in turn is a subsidiary of PDV Holding
Inc., which is wholly owned by PDVSA. A creditor of PDVSA (or, for that matter,
Venezuela) could reach CITGO assets only by overcoming the barrier posed by limited
liability.24
In the sections below, we briefly identify some of the veil-piercing issues that might
arise in connection with efforts to enforce claims against Venezuela or PDVSA.
To reiterate, we use the term ‘veil piercing’ to encompass a range of distinct but
conceptually related doctrines (eg ‘alter ego’ liability, enterprise liability). Thus, we
19 Bancec (n 9) 627.
20 ibid 629.
21 Kirschenbaum v 650 Fifth Ave and Related Properties, 830 F 3d 107 (2nd Cir 2016).
22 Bridas SAPIC v Government of Turkmenistan, 447 F 3d 411, 416–20 (5th Cir 2006).
23 For guaranteed debt, of course, creditors may seek to recover directly from the guarantor. As an example, much of PDVSA’s
debt is guaranteed by PDVSA Petro´leo, SA.
24 See eg Las Palmas Assoc v Las Palmas Center Assoc, 235 Cal App 3d 1220 (1991).
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sacrifice a degree of conceptual clarity in order to concisely describe several plausible
scenarios in which creditors might encounter the barrier of limited liability.
‘Simple’ veil piercing: PDVSA and Venezuela
To begin, it may help to consider the circumstances under which a creditor might try to
impose PDVSA’s liabilities on the government of Venezuela, or vice versa. (The latter
scenario, in which the shareholder’s debts are imposed on the firm, is sometimes called
‘reverse’ veil piercing.) The practical impact of veil piercing in this context would be
limited by the fact that both the government and PDVSA have assets primarily in
Venezuela. In addition, to the extent PDVSA’s assets in Venezuela are used to provide a
public service, the government may block creditors from attaching the assets.25 However,
it is plausible to assume that creditors of each entity would derive some benefit from a
decision to disregard the legal boundaries between PDVSA and the Venezuelan
government. If nothing else, such a decision would expand the range of assets potentially
available to satisfy creditor claims.26
Even if we were inclined to offer an opinion on the merits of piercing the PDVSA
corporate veil, the public information available is too limited for that purpose. As noted,
PDVSA is wholly owned by the government. Its Board of Directors is directly appointed
by the President of Venezuela,27 the Minister of Energy and Petroleum has traditionally
been its president,28 and several members of its current board are government officials.
Control over the board necessarily confers opportunities to control PDVSA’s corporate
actions. The government also controls some aspects of PDVSA’s pricing decisions; for
instance, it sets prices for gasoline, diesel and natural gas sold domestically.29 In addition,
PDVSA is expected to make sizeable contributions to Venezuelan social programmes,
including the Fondo de Desarrollo Nacional, an entity created to finance and manage
public health, education and welfare projects. These contributions have increased in
amount despite plummeting oil prices and a general deterioration in PDVSA’s financial
position.30
Recently, the government has increased the role of the military in Venezuelan natural
resources projects. In 2016, the government created the Compan´ia Ano´nima Militar de
Industrials Mineras, Petrolı´feras, y de Gas (CAMIMPEG), an entity within the ministry of
defence with the purpose of undertaking activities relating to oil services, gas and
mining.31 The government’s reasons for creating CAMIMPEG are unclear, but it is
conceivable that some PDVSA assets might be transferred to CAMIMPEG.
25 art 97, Law of the Office of the Attorney General of Venezuela (Ley Orga´nica de la Procuradurı´a General de la Repu´blica).
26 For instance, if PDVSA’s creditors can enforce claims against government assets, this will complicate the government’s efforts
to engage in foreign commercial or financial transactions until claims against PDVSA are resolved.
27 Offering Circular: Offers to Exchange, Petro´leos de Venezuela, SA (16 September 2016) 35https://www.scribd.com/document/
324333858/PDVSA-2017-into-2020-Exchange-Offer-OC-16-September-20164 accessed 1 February 2017. [hereinafter Offering
Circular].
28 The role is now filled by Eulogio Del Pino.
29 Offering Circular (n 27) 26.
30 ibid 61.
31 ibid 6.
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Although these facts reveal that Venezuela exercises significant control over PDVSA
and some aspects of its operations, they do not clearly make out a case for veil piercing.
Close working relationships and closely aligned interests typify all relationships between
governments and government instrumentalities.32 That the government owns 100 per
cent of PDVSA and appoints its board does not demonstrate the required degree of
control.33 Instead, a creditor must show that the government exercises substantial control
over day-to-day operations.34 The question is whether the government dominates
PDVSA’s day-to-day operations to such an extent "that a relationship of principal and
agent is created.’’35 As an example, one case found a corporation to be the ‘alter ego’ of a
foreign government where, among other indicia of control, the government insisted on
approving any shipment over $13,000 in value and any check in excess of $25,000 had to
be signed by a government official.36
As an alternative to a showing of control, a creditor might argue that piercing the
corporate veil is necessary ‘to prevent fraud or injustice’.37 As an example, consider cases
in which a foreign government conducts transactions through a corporate shell, or
siphons assets from a corporation for the purpose of keeping them out of the reach of
creditors. To be sure, the limited public information reveals some facts that might
support such an argument, including the use of PDVSA funds to support other
government priorities (while PDVSA’s economic position was deteriorating), the setting
of artificially low domestic prices (ie making PDVSA subsidize domestic consumption)
and the creation of CAMIMPEG (if PDVSA assets are transferred to that entity).
At present, however, the facts do not obviously resemble other cases in which courts have
pierced the corporate veil of a state-owned enterprise. For instance, in Bridas SAPIC v
Government of Turkmenistan,38 a foreign creditor initiated an arbitration proceeding
against an entity wholly owned by the Government of Turkmenistan. The parties had
been involved in a joint venture to develop oil and gas reserves. In response to the
arbitration, the government dissolved the state-owned entity, replaced it with another,
and decreed that all proceeds from oil and gas exports were to be placed in a special fund
whose assets were immune from seizure. As the court noted: ‘Intentionally bleeding a
subsidiary to thwart creditors is a classic ground for piercing the corporate veil.’39
We close this section by noting that questions of sovereign immunity—while often
overemphasized in the sovereign debt context—are not irrelevant when liability is
premised on a veil-piercing theory. For instance, although both Venezuela and PDVSA
have waived sovereign immunity, the waivers extend only to lawsuits brought in
32 Minpeco, SA v Hunt, 686 F Supp 427, 437 (1988).
33 See eg Foremost-McKesson v Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F 2d 438, 448 (DC Cir 1990); Hercaire v Argentina, 821 F 2d 559,
564–65 (11th Cir 1987).
34 General Star Nat Ins v Administratia Asigurarilor, 713 F Supp 2d 267 (SDNY 2010).
35 Bancec (n 9) 629 (quotation omitted).
36 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co v Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 616 F Supp 660 (WD Mich 1985).
37 General Star (n 34) 284.
38 See n 22.
39 ibid 420.
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connection with the relevant notes or indenture. Thus, if a creditor of PDVSA
successfully argued for imposing liability on Venezuela, it would have to find another
basis for overcoming the government’s sovereign immunity in foreign courts. In such a
case, one possibility would be for the court to impute PDVSA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity to the government. Failing that, the creditor would have to rely on the baseline
exceptions to sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.40
Diverting assets away from PDVSA
In this section, we discuss scenarios in which Venezuela strips PDVSA of assets that might
make it an attractive target for creditors. The most salient possibility—already proposed
by Ricardo Hausmann and Mark Walker—is for Venezuela to withdraw PDVSA’s
monopoly over exploiting hydrocarbon reserves. For obvious reasons, this step would
severely impair PDVSA’s ability to satisfy creditor claims and provide a much stronger
legal basis for piercing the corporate veil. As noted, ‘intentionally bleeding’ a corporation
for the purpose of keeping assets away from creditors is a classic ground for veil
piercing.41 Whether or not the government controls PDVSA’s day-to-day operations, it
might incur liability to PDVSA’s creditors by stripping assets in this manner. (This is
independent of any liability that might be imposed on any new entity empowered to
exploit hydrocarbon reserves, which would arguably be the beneficiary of a fraudulent
transfer of assets.)
From the government’s perspective, this may be a risk worth taking. Because the
government can shelter many assets within its borders, PDVSA’s creditors will have a
hard time finding attachable government assets. On the other hand, the government may
find PDVSA’s creditors to be a thorn in its side. For claims arising from its own bond
debt, the government can at least hope that collective action clauses will allow it to
impose restructuring terms on dissenting creditors. These clauses cannot help it resolve
claims asserted by creditors of PDVSA. And as Argentina’s experience illustrates,
motivated judgment creditors can disrupt a wide range of transactions that a government
might wish to undertake outside its borders.
Assets belonging to PDVSA subsidiaries
Finally, we consider whether creditors of PDVSA or Venezuela might succeed in
attaching shares in, or assets belonging to, entities that conduct Venezuela’s natural
resource operations abroad. (Implicitly, our analysis also covers the scenario in which
creditors of these entities seek to pin liability on PDVSA or Venezuela, although in that
case sovereign immunity would pose an additional barrier.) For instance, creditors might
try to attach physical assets or contract rights (eg rights to payment) belonging to
CITGO. To the extent these assets have already been pledged as security for loans, they
might have little value to a judgment creditor.42 Still, the ability to attach productive
40 See eg 28 USC ss 1605 and 1710.
41 See Bridas (n 22) 420.
42 For example, PDVSA’s recent exchange offer was secured by a first lien on 50.1% of the capital stock of CITGO Holding, Inc.
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assets in the USA might provide additional leverage to creditors in disputes with PDVSA
and Venezuela.
Piercing the corporate veil in this context may prove difficult. To illustrate, consider
the relationship between PDVSA and CITGO. Through its ownership of PDV Holding,
PDVSA (and, ultimately, the Venezuelan government) indirectly controls the board of
directors of CITGO Holding and can indirectly control the selection of senior
management.43 Historically, PDVSA and its affiliates have also maintained close
commercial ties to CITGO, supplying a significant portion (over one-third) of
CITGO’s crude oil requirements.44 By themselves, these facts come nowhere close to
the level of control over day-to-day operations necessary to impose liability on these
affiliates.
Additional facts related to veil piercing, however, stem from loans taken by CITGO
Holding in 2015, the proceeds of which were apparently paid as a dividend to
Venezuela.45 Creditors have alleged that this loan represented a scheme orchestrated by
PDVSA and the Venezuelan government to divert CITGO assets into Venezuelan
coffers.46 Thus far, these allegations have primarily surfaced in litigation alleging
fraudulent transfer claims against PDVSA and other entities.47 For our purposes,
however, it is worth noting that the degree of control (allegedly) exercised by Venezuela
and PDVSA over the US-based entities would make veil-piercing claims more credible.
4. Conclusion
The law governing limited liability and its exceptions is complex, and we have barely
scratched the surface. Nor have we even begun to discuss many other issues that would
impact creditors’ efforts to enforce claims against Venezuela or PDVSA. These include
the law of sovereign immunity and the potential for PDVSA and its subsidiaries to seek to
resolve their debts in bankruptcy proceedings (both within and outside of Venezuela).
The fact that Venezuela’s economy is so heavily dependent on exports has led some
observers to assume that creditors can easily seize assets associated with natural resource
exploitation.48 Our main point is that matters are not so simple.49 The doctrine of limited
liability is one of many bodies of law (and transactional structures50) that will constrain
creditor enforcement options.
43 Offering Circular (n 27) A-29.
44 ibid A-22.
45 See eg Crystallex Int’l Corp v Petro´leos de Venezuela, SA, No 15-1082-LPS, 2016 WL 5724777 (30 September 2016).
46 ibid.
47 ibid.
48 See eg ‘Venezuela: Bonds and Barrels’ Financial Times (London, 7 January 2015).
49 For more nuanced assessments, see J Dizard, ‘How to Value (Worthless) Venezuelan Oil Bonds’ Financial Times
(23 September 2016), and N Maurer, ‘Can Venezuela’s Creditors Grab Venezuelan Assets in a Default’ (The Power and the Money,
22 January 2015)5http://noelmaurer.typepad.com4 accessed 1 February 2017.
50 As a simple example, transferring title to oil to a buyer at a Venezuelan export terminal may prevent creditors of Venezuela
from attaching the oil.
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